Abstract. We extend the classic cake-cutting problem to a situation in which the "cake" is divided among families. Each piece of cake is owned and used simultaneously by all members of the family. A typical example of such a cake is land. We examine three ways to assess the fairness of such a division, based on the classic no-envy criterion: (a) Average envy-freeness means that for each family, the average value of its share (averaged over all family members) is weakly larger than the average value of any other share; (b) Unanimous envy-freeness means that in each family, each member values the family's share weakly more than any other share; (c) Democratic envy-freeness means that in each family, at least half the members value the family's share weakly more than any other share. We study each of these definitions from both an existential and a computational perspective.
Introduction
Fair division of land and other resources among agents with different preferences has been an important issue since Biblical times. Today it is an active area of research in the interface of computer science [29, 26] and economics [25] . Its applications range from politics [8, 7] to multi-agent systems [11] .
In most fair division problems, the goods are divided to individual agents, and the fairness of a division is assessed based on the valuation of each agent. A common fairness criterion is envy-freeness: a division is called envy-free if each agent values his own share at least as much as any other share.
However, in real life, goods are often owned and used by groups. As an example, consider a land-estate inherited by k families, or a nature reserve that should be divided among k states. The land should be divided to k pieces, one piece per group. Each group's share is then used by all members of the group together. The land-plot allotted to a family is inhabited by the entire family. The share of the nature-reserve alloted to a state becomes a national park open to all citizens of that state. In economic terms, the alloted piece becomes a "club good" [10] . The happiness of each group member depends on his/her valuation of the entire share of the group. But, in each group there are different people with different valuations. The same division can be considered envy-free by some family members and not envy-free by other members of the same family. How, then, should the fairness of the division be assessed?
One option that comes to mind is to aggregate the valuations in each family to a single family valuation (also known as: collective welfare function). Following the utilitarian tradition [4] , the family-valuation can be defined as the sum or (equivalently) the arithmetic average of the valuations of all family members. We call a division average-envy-free if, for each family, the average valuation of the family's share (averaged over all family members) is weakly larger than the average valuation of any share allocated to another family. This definition makes sense in situations in which the numeric values of the agents' valuations are meaningful and they are all measured in the same units, e.g. in dollars (see chapter 3 of [25] for some real-life examples of such situations). In such cases, it may be possible to transfer value between members of a group after the division is done. Members who are more satisfied with the division can somehow compensate the less satisfied members, such that finally each member enjoys the average value.
A second option is to require that no member of any family feels any envy. We call a division unanimous-envy-free if every agent values his family's share at least as much as the share of any other family. The advantage of this definition is that it does not depend on the units in which the valuation functions are measured. It is applicable even when the valuations are only abstract representations of ordinal preferences.
A disadvantage of unanimous-envy-freeness is that it may be difficult to attain in practice, especially when the "families" are large. As citizens in democratic states, we know that it is next to impossible to attain unanimity on even the most trivial issue. Therefore, it is not realistic to expect that all citizens agree that a certain division is envy-free. We call a division democratic-envy-free if at least half the citizens in each family value their family's share at least as much as the share of any other family. This definition makes sense when land is divided between states with a democratic regime. After a division is proposed, each state conducts a referendum in which each citizen approves the division if he/she feels that the division is envy-free. The division is implemented only if, in every state, at least half of its members approve it.
Of the three definitions presented above, unanimous-envy-free is clearly the strongest: it implies both average-envy-free and democratic-envy-free. The other two definitions do not imply each other, as shown below. Consider a land-estate consisting of four districts. It has to be divided between two families: (1) Alice+Bob+Charlie and (2) David+Eva+Frankie. The valuation of each member to each district is shown in the table to the right.
Example
If the two leftmost districts are given to family 1 and the two rightmost districts are given to family 2, then the division is unanimous-envy-free, since each member of each family feels that his family's share is better than the other family's share. It is also, of course, average-envy-free and democratic-envy-free.
If only the single leftmost district is given to family 1 and the other three districts are given to family 2, then the division is still democratic-envy-free, since Alice and Bob feel that their family received a better share than the other family. However, Charlie does not feel that way, so the division is not unanimous-envyfree. Moreover, the division is not average-envy-free since the average valuation of family 1 in its own share is (6+5+1)/3=4, while the average valuation of family 1 in the other share is (3+4+8)/3=5.
If the three leftmost districts are given to family 1 and only the rightmost district is given to family 2, then the division is average-envy-free, since the average valuation of family 2 in its share is (3+3+9)/3=5 while its average valuation in the other share is (6+6+0)/3=4. However, it is not unanimousenvy-free and not even democratic-envy-free, since David and Eva feel that the share given to the other family is more valuable.
⊓ ⊔ Two challenges arise once the fairness criterion is selected. First, determine whether there always exists a division satisfying this criterion. In case the answer is yes, determine whether there exists a protocol for achieving such a division. Cake-cutting protocols are traditionally characterized by two factors: the number of connectivity components in the final division, and the number of queries required to achieve the division. We now briefly explain each of these factors, as they are relevant to our results.
Number of connectivity components
Ideally, we would like to allocate to each family a single, connected piece. This requirement is especially meaningful when the divided resource is land, since a contiguous piece of land is much easier to use than a collection of disconnected patches. However, a division with connected pieces is not always possible.
In fact, many countries have a disconnected territory. A striking example is the India-Bangladesh border. According to Wikipedia, 1 "Within the main body of Bangladesh were 102 enclaves of Indian territory, which in turn contained 21 Bangladeshi counter-enclaves, one of which contained an Indian counter-counterenclave... within the Indian mainland were 71 Bangladeshi enclaves, containing 3 Indian counter-enclaves". Another example is Baarle-Hertog -a Belgian municipality made of 24 separate parcels of land, most of which are exclaves in the Netherlands.
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In case a division with connected pieces is not possible, it is desirable to minimize the number of connectivity components (hence: components) in the division. Minimizing the number of components is a common requirement in the cake-cutting literature. It is common to assume that the cake is a 1-dimensional interval. In this case, the components are sub-intervals and their number is one plus the number of cuts. Hence, the number of components is minimized by minimizing the number of cuts [28, 37, 32, 2, 3] .
In a realistic, 3-dimensional world, the additional dimensions can be used to connect the components, e.g, by bridges or tunnels. Still, it is desirable to minimize the number of components in the original division in order to reduce the number of required bridges/tunnels.
The goal of minimizing the number of components is also pursued in real-life politics. Going back to India and Bangladesh, after many years of negotiations they finally started to exchange most of their enclaves during the years 2015-2016. This is expected to reduce the number of components from 200 to a more reasonable number.
Number of queries
The most common model for cake-cutting protocols is the query model, formally defined by Robertson and Webb [29] . Intuitively, a cake-cutting protocol uses two types of queries: a mark query (also called cut query) asks an agent "where would you cut the cake such that the value of the resulting piece is X?" and an eval query asks an agent "how much is piece Y worth for you?". This model has been used to prove results about the query complexity of cakecutting protocols, e.g. [18, 17] . Interestingly, some cake-cutting problems cannot be solved with a finite number of queries. For example, with 3 or more agents, an envy-free division cannot be attained by a finite protocol when the pieces must be connected [34] .
Results
Our results regarding the three fairness definitions are summarized in the following theorems. In all theorems, k ≥ 2 is the number of families and n is the total number of agents in all families. In the impossibility results, it is implicitly assumed that at least one family contains at least 2 members (which implies n > k).
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A property of cake partitions is called feasible if for every k families and n agents there exists an allocation satisfying this property. Otherwise, the property is called infeasible.
Theorem 1. (average-envy-freeness) (a) average-envy-freeness with connected pieces is feasible. (b) average-envy-freeness, with either connected or disconnected pieces, cannot be found by a finite protocol.

Theorem 2. (unanimous-envy-freeness) (a) unanimous-envy-freeness with connected pieces is infeasible. Moreover, at least n components might be required for a unanimous-envy-free division. (b) unanimous-envy-freeness with disconnected pieces is feasible. Moreover, the number of required components is at most
(c) A unanimous-envy-free division cannot be found by a finite protocol.
(b) democratic-envy-freeness with disconnected pieces is always feasible. Moreover, the number of required components is at most 1 + (k − 1)(n/2 − 1).
(c) When there are k = 2 families, democratic-envy-freeness with connected pieces is feasible. Moreover, there is a finite protocol for finding a democraticenvy-free division using at most n queries.
The results are summarized in the table below. For k = 2, the results are tight: by all fairness definitions, we know that a fair division exists with the smallest possible number of connectivity components. For k > 2, the results are not tight. As an illustration of the currently unsolved gaps, the table includes numeric values for k = 3 and k = 4.
Envy-freeness #Families (k)
#Connectivity Components Finite Lower bound Existence Procedure
Model and Notation
The cake to be divided is C. As in many cake-cutting papers, C is assumed to be the unit interval [0, 1]. The total number of agents in all families is n. Every agent i ∈ {1, ..., n} has a personal value function V i , defined on the Borel subsets of C. The V i are assumed to be absolutely continuous with respect to the length measure (or simply continuous). This implies that all singular points have a value of 0 to all agents (a property often termed non-atomicity).
Additionally, the value functions are assumed to be additive -the value of a union of two disjoint pieces is the sum of the values of the pieces.
The continuity and additivity assumptions are common to most cake-cutting papers. 4 The number of families is k. The families are called F j , j ∈ {1, ..., k}. The number of members in family F j is n j . Each agent is a member of exactly one family, so n = k j=1 n j . An allocation is a vector of k pieces, X = (X 1 , . . . , X k ), one piece per family, such that the X i are pairwise-disjoint and ∪ i X i = C.
Ideally, we would like that each piece be connected (i.e, an interval). If this is not possible, then each piece should be a finite union of intervals, where the total number of components (intervals) should be as small as possible.
In the division procedures presented here, it is assumed that all agents act according to their true value functions and not strategically. Designing cakecutting mechanisms that take agents' strategies into account is a challenging task even for individual agents [9] and we leave it to future work.
Average fairness
In this section we prove Theorem 1. We assume that the value functions of the agents are additive, and define the following family-valuations:
Existence
Lemma 1. Given any n additive value functions V i , i = 1, ..., n and any grouping of the agents to k families, there exists an average-envy-free division in which each family receives a connected piece (the total number of components is k).
Proof. Given any n additive value functions V i , the k family-valuations W j defined above are also additive. Hence, the classic cake-cutting results are applicable: each of the k families in our problem can be treated as an individual agent in the classic solution. For example, Simmons' protocol [36] implies the existence of an average-envy-free division in which each family receives a connected piece.
Non-existence of finite protocols
While the existence results from classic cake-cutting are applicable in our setting, their query complexity is not preserved. The simplest cake-cutting protocolcut-and-choose -finds a connected envy-free division between two individuals using only two queries (one cuts, the other chooses). However, with two families instead of two individuals, any finite number of queries might be insufficient, regardless of the number of components. Proof. We prove that the lemma is true even in the simplest case in which there are two families. Suppose one family, e.g. F 1 , has two members: F 1 = {1, 2}, so their family valuation is:
Also suppose that the valuation of each member of F 2 is W 1 , so that their family valuation is W 2 ≡ W 1 . For convenience, assume here that the agents' valuations are normalized such that the value of the entire cake is 1. Finding an average-envy-free division now amounts to finding a piece X ⊆ C such that W 1 (X) = W 2 (X) = 1/2. This is equivalent to finding a piece X ⊆ C such that V 1 (X) + V 2 (X) = 1. Hence, our lemma reduces to the following lemma:
There is no finite protocol that, given two agents with value measures
Proof. Define an average piece as a piece X ⊆ C such that:
We now prove that finding an average piece might require an infinite number of queries.
Each eval or mark query involves two points in [0, 1]: in an eval query, both points are determined by the protocol; in a mark query, one point is replied by the agent. Call these points the "known points" and include the endpoints 0 and 1 in the set of known points. Let P m be the set of known points before step m. Initially P 1 = {0, 1}. Each query potentially increases P m by at most two points. For example, after a mark(0.1, v) query with a reply of 0.2, P m = {0, 0.1, 0.2, 1}. The protocol can be conceptually divided into steps, such that in each step, one point is added to P m . Hence, for every m ≥ 1, |P m | = m + 1.
If the protocol returns a result at step m, this result must be a collection of intervals whose endpoints are in P m , since the values of subsets with different endpoints are not known to the protocol. Let I m be the set of m intervals whose endpoints are nearby points in P m . If the protocol returns at step m, the result must be a subset of I m . Let V m = {V 1 (X) + V 2 (X)|X ⊆ I m }. I.e, V m is the set of all values of pieces that can be returned by the protocol at step m. Note that V m is finite and |V m | ≤ 2 m . The protocol can return an average piece at step m, if and only if 1 ∈ V m . We now prove that this cannot be guaranteed in a finite protocol.
The proof is by induction on m. 
I.e, the new possible values are the previous possible values, plus or minus the values of the new intervals (since the new intervals can be added or subtracted from any piece).
Suppose step m is a mark query sent to agent 1. This means that the protocol can control the values
since the query can be sent to only one agent at a time. Similarly, if the query is sent to agent 2 then the protocol can control
. In both cases, the protocol cannot control v p , v r . This means that for every protocol, there can be value measures such that the new values added to V m do not include 1, so 1 / ∈ V m+1 :
To conclude: after any finite number m of steps, the set of possible piece values V m is finite, and an adversary can select the value measures such that it does not contain 1. Hence finding an average piece cannot be guaranteed.
Note: A similar idea was used by [29] to prove that it is impossible to find an exact division with a finite number of queries.
Unanimous fairness
This section proves Theorem 2. A division is called unanimous-envy-free if:
We denote by UnanimousEnvyFree(n, k) the problem of finding a unanimousenvy-free division when there are n agents grouped in k families. We relate this problem to the classic cake-cutting problem of finding an exact division: Exact(N, K) is the following problem. Given N agents and an integer K, find a division of the cake to K pieces, such that each of the N agents assigns exactly the same value to all pieces:
Alon [1] proved that for every N and K, Exact(N, K) has a solution with at most N (K − 1) + 1 components. He also showed that this number is the smallest that can be guaranteed. We now use these results in our setting. To this end, we show a two-way reduction between the problem of unanimous-envy-free division and the problem of exact division.
Lemma 4 (Exact =⇒ UnanimousEnvyFree). For each n, k, a solution to Exact (n−1, k) implies a solution to UnanimousEnvyFree (n, k) for any grouping of the n agents to k families.
Proof. Suppose we are given an instance of UnanimousEnvyFree(n, k), i.e, n agents in k families. Select n − 1 agents arbitrarily. Use Exact(n − 1, k) to find a partition of the cake to k pieces, such that each of the n − 1 agents is indifferent between these k pieces. Ask the n-th agent to choose his favorite piece. Give that piece to the family of the n-th agent. Give the other k − 1 pieces arbitrarily to the remaining k − 1 families. The division is unanimous-envy-free.
Combining this lemma with the result of [1] immediately implies the following upper bound on the number of required components:
Corollary 1. Given n agents in k families, there exists a unanimous-envy-free division with at most
Proof. Given an instance of Exact(N, K) (N agents and a number K of required pieces), create K families. In each of the first K − 1 families, put a copy of each of the N agents. In the K-th family, put a single agent whose value measure is the average of the given N value measures:
The total number of agents in all K families is N (K − 1) + 1. Use UnanimousEnvyFree (N (K − 1) + 1, K) to find a unanimous-envy-free division, X. By the pigeonhole principle, for each agent i in family j:
By construction, each of the first K − 1 families has a copy of agent i. Hence, all N agents values each of the first K − 1 pieces as at least 1/K and:
Hence, by additivity, every agent values the K-th piece as at most 1/K:
The piece X K is given to the agent with value measure V * , so again by the pigeonhole principle:
is the average of the V i (X K ). Hence, necessarily:
Again by additivity:
Hence, necessarily:
So we have found an exact division and solved Exact(N, K) as required.
[1] proved that for every N and K, an Exact(N, K) division might require at least N (K − 1) + 1 components. Combining this result with the above lemma implies the following negative result:
unanimous-envy-free division for n agents in K families might require at least n components.
This corollary implies that, in particular, unanimous-envy-freeness with connected pieces is infeasible. This impossibility result is generalized in Lemma 6.
Infinite procedures and approximations
It is impossible to solve Exact(N, K) by a finite protocol whenever N ≥ 2 and K ≥ 2 [29, pp. 103-104] . By Lemma 5, this implies: Corollary 3. UnanimousEnvyFree cannot be solved by a finite protocol whenever n > k. 5 However, there is an approximation procedure that converges to an exact division of a cake to k = 2 pieces [33] . By Lemma 4, this procedure can be used to find an approximate unanimous-envy-free division for two families.
Democratic fairness
In this section we prove Theorem 3. A division X is called democratic-envyfree if for all j, j ′ = 1, ..., k, for at least half the members i ∈ F j :
Existence and number of components
Given a specific allocation of cake to families, define a positive agent as an agent that values his family's share as more than 0. Note that this is a much weaker requirement than proportionality. Define a zero agent as a non-positive agent.
Lemma 6. Assume there are n = mk agents, divided into k families with m members in each family. To guarantee that at least q members in each family are positive, the total number of components might have to be at least:
Proof. Number the families by j = 0, ..., k − 1 and the members in each family by i = 0, ..., m − 1. Assume that the cake is the 1-dimensional interval [0, mk].
In each family j, each member i wants only the following interval: (ik + j, ik + j + 1). Thus there is no overlap between desired pieces of different members. The table below illustrates the construction for k = 2, m = 3. The families are {Alice,Bob,Charlie} and {David,Eva,Frankie}: Suppose the piece X j (the piece given to family j) is made of l ≥ 1 components. We can make l members of F j positive using l intervals of positive length inside their desired areas. However, if q > l, we also have to make the remaining q − l members positive. For this, we have to extend q − l intervals to length k. Each such extension totally covers the desired area of one member in each of the other families. Overall, each family creates q − l zero members in each of the other families. The number of zero members in each family is thus (k − 1)(q − l). Adding the q members which must be positive in each family, we get the following necessary condition: (k − 1)(q − l) + q ≤ m. This is equivalent to:
The total number of components is k · l, which is at least the expression stated in the Lemma.
⊓ ⊔
In a unanimous-envy-free division, all members in each family must be positive. Taking q = m gives l ≥ m and the number of components is at least km = n, which is the bound of Corollary 2. In a democratic-envy-free division, at least half the members in each family must be positive. Taking q = m/2 gives: Corollary 4. In a democratic-envy-free division with n agents grouped into k families, the number of components might have to be at least
Note that when k = 2, the lower bound of Corollary 4 is 0. Indeed, for two families there always exist democratic-envy-free divisions with connected pieces. This is proved in the next subsection.
Division procedure
Algorithm 1 describes a procedure that achieves a democratic-envy-free division for two families. For each family, a location M j is calculated such that, if the cake is cut at M j , half the members value the interval [0, M j ] as at least 1/2 and the other half value the interval [M j , 1] as at least 1/2. Then, the cake is cut between the two family medians, and each family receives the piece containing its own median. By construction, at least half the members in each family value their family's share as at least 1/2, so the division is democratic-envy-free. The division has only 2 components (each family receives a connected piece). In contrast to the impossibility results of the previous sections, this protocol is finite. In fact, it requires only n mark queries (one query per agent).
Algorithm 1 Finding a democratic-envy-free division for two families
INPUT: -A cake, which is assumed to be the unit interval [0, 1].
-n agents, all of whom value the cake as 1.
-A grouping of the agents to 2 families, F1, F2.
OUTPUT:
A democratic-envy-free division of the cake to 2 pieces. The above procedure does not work for more than 2 families. Currently, all we have is the following existence result, which is a trivial outcome of the existence results of Section 4. Apply these results with n/2 instead of n: select half of the members in each family arbitrarily, then find a division which is unanimous-envy-free for them while ignoring all other members. Hence:
Corollary 5. Given n agents in k families, there exists a democratic-envy-free division with at most (k − 1) · (n/2 − 1) + 1 components.
It is an interesting open question whether a democratic-envy-free division for 3 or more families (with disconnected pieces) can be found by a finite protocol.
Alternatives
Instead of envy-freeness, it is possible to use proportionality as the basic fairness criterion. Proportionality means that, when there are k families, each family receives at least 1/k of its total cake value. Then, average-proportionality means that the average value of each family in its allocated share (averaged over all family members) is at least 1/k of the average value of the entire cake; unanimous-proportionality means that every agent values its family's share as at least 1/k of the total; democratic-proportionality is defined analogously. When the valuations are additive, envy-freeness implies proportionality; when there are only two families, proportionality implies envy-freeness. Theorem 1 (Section 3) holds as-is for average-proportionality. In Theorems 2 and 3, the number of components in the positive results can be improved from O(nk) to O(n log k), using a recursive halving technique. See [31] for details.
The above criteria assume that all families have equal entitlements. This makes sense, for example, when k siblings inherit their parents' estate. While an heir will probably like to take his family's preferences into account when selecting a share, each heir is entitled to exactly 1/k of the estate regardless of the size of his/her family. In general, each family may have a different entitlement. The entitlement of a family may depend on its size but may also depend on other factors. For example, when two states jointly discover a new island, they will probably want to divide the island between them in proportion to their investments and not in proportion their population. This generalized problem can be solved by applying results in cake-cutting with unequal entitlements. In particular, Stromquist and Woodall [35] prove that, for every fraction r ∈ [0, 1], it is possible to cut a piece of cake made of at most n intervals, which each agent values as exactly r of the total cake value. This result can be used to generalize our theorems to families with different entitlements. See [31] for details.
One could consider the following alternative fairness criterion: an allocation is individually-proportional if the allocation X = (X 1 , . . . , X k ) admits a refinement Y = (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ), where for each family F j , ∪ i∈Fj Y i = X j , such that for each agent i, V i (Y i ) ≥ 1/n. Individually-proportional allocations always exist and can be found by using any classic proportional cake-cutting procedure on the individual agents, disregarding their families. The number of components is at most n. Individual-proportionality makes sense if, after the land is divided among the families, each family intends to further divide its share among its members. However, often this is not the case. When an inherited land-estate is divided between two families, the members of each family intend to live and use their entire share together, rather than dividing it among them. Therefore, the happiness of each family member depends on the entire value of his family's share, rather than on the value of a potential private share he would get in a hypothetic sub-division.
There are numerous papers about fair division in general and fair cake-cutting in particular. We mentioned some of them in the introduction. Here we survey some work that is more closely related to family-based fairness.
7.1 Group-envy-freeness and on-the-fly coalitions [5, 20] study the concept of group-envy-free cake-cutting. Their model is the standard cake-cutting model in which the cake is divided among individuals (and not among families as in our model). They define a group-envy-free division as a division in which no coalition of individuals can take the pieces allocated to another coalition with the same number of individuals and re-divide the pieces among its members such that all members are weakly better-off. Coalitions are also studied by [12, 13] .
In our setting, the families are pre-determined and the agents do not form coalitions on-the-fly. In an alternative model, in which agents are allowed to form coalitions based on their preferences, the family-cake-cutting problem becomes easier. For instance, it is easy to achieve a unanimous-proportional division with connected pieces between two coalitions: ask each agent to mark its median line, find the median of all medians, then divide the agents to two coalitions according to whether their median line is to the left or to the right of the median-ofmedians.
Fair division with public goods
In our setting, the piece given to each family is considered a "public good" in this specific family. The existence of fair allocations of homogeneous goods when some of the goods are public has been studied e.g. by [14, 15, 16, 19] . In these studies, each good is either private (consumed by a single agent) or public (consumed by all agents). In the present paper, each piece of land is consumed by all agents in a single family -a situation not captured by existing public-good models.
Family preferences in matching markets
Besides land division, family preferences are important in matching markets, too. For example, when matching doctors to hospitals, usually a husband and a wife want to be matched to the same hospital. This issue poses a substantial challenge to stable-matching mechanisms [21, 22, 23] .
Fairness in group decisions
The notion of fairness between groups has been studied empirically in the context of the well-known ultimatum game. In the standard version of this game, an individual agent (the proposer ) suggests a division of a sum of money to another individual (the responder ), which can either approve or reject it. In the group version, either the proposer or the responder or both are groups of agents. The groups have to decide together what division to propose and whether to accept a proposed division.
Experiments by [27, 6] show that, in general, groups tend to act more rationally by proposing and accepting divisions which are less fair. [24] studies the effect of different group decision rules while [30] uses a threshold decision rule which is a generalized version of our majority rule (an allocation is accepted if at least M agents in the responder group vote to accept it).
These studies are only tangentially relevant to the present paper, since they deal with a much simpler division problem in which the divided good is homogeneous (money) rather than heterogeneous (cake/land).
Conclusions
One practical conclusion that can be drawn from our results concerns the selection of fairness criterion. When n (the total number of agents) is sufficiently small, it is reasonable to use unanimous-fairness, which guarantees that all agents are satisfied with their family's share. However, when n is large, as is the case when dividing land between states, insisting on unanimous-fairness might result in each country having an absurdly fractioned territory. In this case, democraticfairness is a more reasonable choice. This is particularly true when there are only two states, since in this case democratic-fairness can be achieved with connected pieces and in finite time, which is impossible with the other fairness criteria.
